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'JOHN W. SCOTT, Respondent, v. WINIFRED C. SCOTT, 
Appellant. 
: [1J Div,oree-Foreign Deeree&-E1fect of Prior Decree for Sep-
arate Maintenanee.-Although there is a subsisting separate 
maintenance decree, another jurisdiction can grant a divorce 
to one of the parties and validly terminate the relation of 
husband and wife. 
1[2] ld.-Foreign Deeree&-llona Fides of ltesidenee.-A finding' 
that plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Mexico at the time he 
procured a second divorce decree from his first wife was sus-
tained by evidence that he had resided there for approxi-
mately 18 months, that he was unable to work except that he 
was writing books and short stories while in Mexico, that he 
was a retired Army officer whose pension was not sufficient 
to support him in the United States and he therefore lived 
in Mexico, that he leased a residence in Mexico and bis fur-
niture had been there for a long time and was there at the 
time of trial, and that he expected to return to Mexico when 
the litigation was terminated and live there the rest of his life. 
[S] Id.-Foreign Deeree&-Validity-Full Faith and Credit.-A 
second divorce decree which plaintiff procured in Mexico from 
his first wife was valid where a Mexican attorney, whoquali-
iled as an expert on the laws of Mexico, testifl.ed that he ex-
amined the divorce proceedings and the decree granted and 
that under the laws of Mexico plaintiff had been granted a 
valid divorce decree which would be recognized all over 
Mexico, thus making applicable the general rule that where a 
party has established a bona llde residence in Mexico and 
obtained a Mexican divorce decree, such decree is entitled to 
full faith and credit in California. 
['] Id.-Foreign Deeree&-1njunctioDB Against.-Where an ex 
parte injunction restraining plaintiff from proceeding with a 
second divorce action in Mexico was issued some weeks after 
a her.ring in such' proceeding in :which plaintiff personally 
testifl.ed and such injunction was never served on him and 
he had no personal knowledge of it until after the divorce 
was granted, . the injunction could not invalida,te the divorce 
decree. 
[1] See Ca1.J'ur.2d, Divorce and Separation, t 312 et seq.; Am. 
. J'ur., Divorce and Separation, § D41 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, § 305; [2J Divorce, § 306; 
[3, 4] Divorce, § 304; [5] Injunctions, § 14; [6] Divorce, § 306.1. 
) 
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[6] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Acts Completed.-An in-
junction cannot be granted to prohibit an act that has already 
occurred. 
[6] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Res Judicata.-A ruling denying 
plRintiff's application for modification of a separate mainte-
nance decree was not res judicata in a declaratory relief action 
on the question of the validity of a second Mexican divorce 
decree from plaintiff's first wife where, in denying the applica-
tion for modification, the trial court made a finding that, for 
the purposes of that hearing, there was no findings as to the 
vnlidity or invalidity of the Mexican divorce decree. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los· 
Angeles County. Newcomb Condee, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment for plaintiff af-; 
firmed. 
Monta W. Shirley and George W. Nilsson for Appellant. 
Hahn, Ross & Saunders and E. Loyd Saunders for Re-' 
spondent. 
McCOMB, J.-Defendant Winifred C. Scott appeals from 
a judgment ill a declaratory relief action decreeing that a 
divorce procured by plaintiff from her in the District of 
Bravos, State of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico, on March 
17, 1956, was valid. 
. CHRONOLOGY 
i. January 10, 1931, plaintiff and defendant Winifred 
were married. 
ii. July 9, 1948, they separated. 
iii. In 1952 plaintiff procured a Mexican divorce from 
Winifred in Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico. 
iv. December 5, 1952, plaintiff married defendant Elli 
Scott. 
v. December 11, 1952, Winifred filed a separate mainte-
nance action against plaintiff in the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. 
vi. May 9, 1953, the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County awarded Winifred separate maintenance and held i 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Injunctions, § 18; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 6 
et seq. 
Nov; 1958] SCOTT \I. SCOTT 
.(lIl C.2d 249; 331 P.2d 6ft) 
251 
that the Mexican divorce decree procured by" plaintiff in 
1952 was invalid. 
vii. In January 1955 plaintiff, having retired from the 
United States Army, went to Gnadalajara, in the State of 
· J alisco, Republic of Mexico, and employed an attorney to 
,obtain another divorce from Winifred. The attorney filed an 
action in the State of Jalisco, but the judge refused to hear' 
· the case, saying that, so far as he was concerned, the Mexican 
· divorce which plaintiff had procured in 1952 was valid and 
· that plaintiff could obtain a rehearing on it only under an-
: other set of circumstances and charges in the State of 
: Chihuahua. 
: viii. In January 1956 plaintiff went back to Juarez, in 
: the State of Chihuahua, and filed a complaint for divorce 
against Winifred, a copy of which was served upon her by 
mail in Omaha, Nebraska. The hearing in this divorce pro-
ceeding was held on January 14,1956, at which time plaintiff 
personally testified therein. 
ix. March 2, 1956, the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, upon the application of defendant Winifred, after 
service by mail on plaintiff, issued the following injunction: 
"IT Is THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant, JOHN W. SCOTT, his servants and his agents, be 
permanently restrained and enjoined from proceeding with, 
and from maintaining the validity of, any divorce proceed-
ing, or divorce decree obtained, in that certain proceeding 
instituted by defendant herein on or about the 16th day of 
January, 1956, against plaintiff herein for a divorce in the 
Second Civil Court, City of Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, the 
copies of the Summons and Complaint in said proceedings 
having been served upon the plaintiff herein on or about the 
25th day of January, 1956, as is more fully described in the 
Affidavit of Winifred C. Scott in Support of Injunction on 
file herein." 
x. March 17, 1956, defendant Winifred having failed to 
appear in the action, another decree of divorce was granted 
to plaintiff from her by the Mexican court in the State of 
· Chihuahua. 
xi. July 26, 1956, plaintiff filed an application in the Los 
Angeles Superior Court separate maintenance action seeking a 
modification of the support decree, alleging that he had pro-
cured a divorce from Winifred in Mexico. on March 17, 1956. 
In August 1956 the Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
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made an order denying plaintiff's application for a modifica-
tion of the support d('crl'(' and mail!', among others, this find-
ing: "That the Decree of Divorce obtained by the defendant 
in the State of Chihuahua on :March 17, 1956, is contrary to i 
aud is in violation of the injunction issued against the de-
fendant in this action on March 2, 1956, whereby the defend-
ant was restrained from proceeding with any divorce pro-
ceedings instituted in the City of Juarez, State of Chihuahua, 
Mexico. . .. For the purposes of this hearing, there is no 
finding as to the validity or the invalidity of the Mexican 
decree of divorce obtained by the defendant from the plaintiff 
on March 17,1956 .... " (Italics added.) 
xii. August 23, 1956, plaintiff filed the present action for 
declaratory relief, alleging that he had procured a valid de-
cree of divorce from Winifred on March 17, 1956. Winifred 
filed an answer to the complaint, and after trial the court 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, declaring: 
"A. That the Judgment of Divorce between John W. Scott, 
the plainti1I, and Winifred C. Scott, the defendant, dated 
March 17, 1956, in the State of Chihuahua, Republic of 
Mexico, is a valid and subsisting divorce. 
"B. That Winifred C. Scott is not the wife of John W. 
Scott, and that the defendant Elli Scott is the wife of John 
W. Scott. 
"C. That there is the relation, the rights and duties of 
husband and wife as between the plaintiff, John W. Scott, and 
the defendant Elli Scott." 
Questiom: First. Was the second Mexican decree of divorce 
procured by plaintiff from defendant Winifred O. 8coff in-
vtJlid because there was a mbsisting ,eparate maintenance 
decree 'between the parties on March 17, 1956, Ihe date 'aid 
'BeOM Mexican decree was entered' 
No. [1] The following rule is here applicable: 
Although there is a subsisting separate maintenance decree, 
another jurisdiction can grant a divorce to one of the parties 
and validly terminate the relation of husband and wife. 
In Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 {68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. I 
1561, 1 A.L.R.2d 1412], a wife procured a separate main-I 
tenance decree in New York. Thereafter the husband went 
to Nevada and, npon constructive service, was granted an 
ex parte Nevada divorce decree. 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
Nevada decree was entitled to full faith and credit, saying. 
at page 546: "The State has a considerable interest in prevent-
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ing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring of 
marriages from being bastardized" and again, at page 549: 
"Thc result in this situation is to make the divorce divisible-
to givc effect to thc Nevada decrce insofar as it affects marital 
status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony. It 
accommodates the interests of both Nevada and New York in 
this broken marriage by restricting each State to the matters 
of her dominant concern." (See also Worthley v. Worthley, 
44 Ca1.2"d 465, 468 [2] [283 P.2d 19].) 
[2] Second. Was plai1ltiff a bona fide resident of Me:tico 
on March 17, 1956' 
Yes. The trial court found that plaintiff was a bona fide 
resident of Mexico on March 17, 1956, when he procured the 
second decree of divorce from Winifred. 
This finding is amply supported by the following evidence 
in the record: (a) Plaintiff had resided in Mexico from Jan-
uary 5, 1955, to about July 1956; (b) he was unable to work, 
except that he was writing books and short stories while in 
Mexico; (c) he was a retired Army officer, whose pension was 
not sufficient to support him in the United States, and he 
therefore lived in Mexico, where his expenses were less; (d) 
he leased a residence in Mexico, and his furniture had been 
there for a long period of time and was there at the time of 
trial; and (e) he expected to return to Mexico when the 
present litigation was terminated and live there the· rest of 
his life. 
[3] Third. Was the aecond divorce decree which plaintiff 
procured in M e:tico a valid divorce decree' 
Yes. A Mexican attorney who qualified as an expert on 
the laws of Mexico testified that he had examined the divorce 
proceedings and the decree granted March 17, 1956, and that 
under the laws of Mexico plaintiff had been granted a valid 
decree of divorce ft:om Winifred, which decree would be 
recognized in the State of Chihuahua and allover Mexico. 
This being true, the general rule is" applicable that where a 
party has established a bona fide residence in Mexico and 
obtained a Mexican decree of divorce, such decree is entitled 
to full faith and credit in California. (Cf. DeYou1lg v. De-
Young, 27 Ca1.2d 521, 524 [1] et seq. [165 P.2d 457].) 
[4] Fourth. Did the injunction which was granted on 
March :!, 1956, invalidate the divorce decree of March 17, 
1956' 
No. The ex parte injunction restraining plaintiff from pro-
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ceeding with the second divorce action ill Mexico was never 
served on him, and he had no personal knowledge of it until 
after the divorce had becn grantcd. Thc injunction was issued 
Oil :March 2, 19G6, but the hearing in the diYorce proceeding 
had becn held some weeks prior to that time, with plaintiff 
personally testifying therein, on January 14, 1956. Therefore, 
the California court purported to enjoin plaintiff from taking 
action which he had already taken. [5] Obviously an in-
junction cannot be granted to prohibit an act which has 
already occurred. 
[6] Fifth. Was the ru.ling of the Oolifortlia court denying 
plaintiff's applicaHoll for a modification of the separate main-
tenance decree res judicata in the present action on the qtWS-
tion of the 'Validity of the second Mexican divorce decree' 
No. In denying plaintiff's application for a modification 
of the separate maintenance decree, the trial court made thc 
following finding: "For the purposes of this hearing, thcrc 
is no finding as to the validity or the invalidity of the Mexi-
can decree of divorce obtaiIled by the defendant from the 
plaintiff on March 17, 1956." 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spencf', J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. 
Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court determines 
what effect state courts will accord judgments of courts of 
sister states. 
As to judgments of courts of foreign countries, however, 
state courts have generally held that state law is controlJing in 
the absence of treaties or federal legislation. (See Reesf', The 
Status in Tltis Oountry of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 
Columbo L. Rev. 783, 787.) For the most part they have fol-
lowed the rules applicable to judgments of courts of sister 
states. Given the customary invocation of domicile as the 
touchstone of divorce jurisdiction in this country, they have 
generally invoked it also as to divorce decrees of courts of 
foreign countries. They have refused to recognize such de- ' 
crees, absent the domicile of either party in the other country, 
even when that country does 110t require domirile as a ba:;;is 
for divorce. (See 28 N.Y.U.I.J.Rev. 742, 743-745.) 
Critics, however, have pointed out that a country other than 
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,the domi('jJe may have a lp.gifimRfr. int.erp8t. in the mariiaI 
i status of thc partics, eYCll though it does 110t accept the com-
imon law jurisdictional concept of domicilc. (See Howe, The 
: Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York Statc, 
40 Columb.L.Rev. 373, 3i5-376; 40 CaUJ.Rev. 93, 99-100.) 
Likewise the New York courts recognize civil law decrees 
obtained without domicile in the country of the court issuing 
the decree (e.g., G01lld v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14 (138 N.E. 490]) 
. and, under certain circumstances, the English courts do not 
make domicile a condition for the recognition of a foreign 
divorce decree. (E.g., Travers v. Holley [1953], P. 246; see 
;Manning v. Manning [1958], 2 W.L.R. 318; Mann, The Royal 
: Commission of Marriage and Divorce: .Jurisdiction of the 
!English Courts and Recognition of Foreign Decrees, 21 Mod-
ern L.Rev. 1; Armitage v. Attorney General (1906], P. 135; 
I Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and RecognitiO'n of Divorce 
Decrces-A Comparative Study, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 193.) . 
This court has never expressly ruled on the question whether 
a finding of domicile is prerequisite to the recognition in this 
state of a divorce decree rendered abroad.1 Although there 
was a finding of domicile in this case, there should be no im-
plication from the court's opinion herein that would preclude 
contacts with the foreign country other than domicile as a 
basis of jurisdiction. 
Section 1915 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "A 
final judgment of any other tribunal of a foreign country 
having jurisdiction, according to the laws of sUch country, to 
pronounce the judgment, shall have the same effect as in the 
country where rendered, and also the same effect as final judg-
ments rendered in this state." (Italics added.) The first 
task of the eourt is thus to determine whether or not the 
: 1In DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal.2d 521 [165 P.2d 457], we "usumed 
without deciding" that a divorce decree of a :Mexican court could be col-
laterally attacked here if the plaintift' had not been domiciled in the juris· 
diction granting the divorce. In Redi"ker v. Rediker. 35 Cal.2d 796 [221 
P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152], we did not find it necessary to decide whether 
a foreign divorce decree could be attacked on these grounds, since it 
was to be assumed in tile absence of evidence to the contrary that the 
plaintiff was a. bona fide resillent of Cuba and that therefore the foreign 
court had jurisdiction even jf measured by our standards. 
The District Courts of Appeal of this state have denied recognition 
to divorce decrees of a foreign country when domicile was lacking, even 
though the foreign country did not require domicile as a basis for divorce 
jurisdiction. (Sec, e.g., Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cnl.App.2d 426 r37 P.2d 1069]; 
Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 [161 P.2d 490].) These eases 
should be disapproved insofar as they make domicile a sine qua non of 
. recognition. 
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rnT(·j~11 rour!. bad jl1ri8diction under tbe laws of its own; 
c,olll1try. The prohlcm js nol aUlomatically settled, however, 
if there is a determination that there was jurisdiction. The 
court must then go on to determine whether recognition of the: 
foreign decree would violate due process limitations or estab-' 
lished local policy, for we cannot assume that in section 1915 
the" Legislature meant to override such limitations or policy. 
If there is no such violation, a decree of divorce that is valid 
according to the laws of the foreign country should be recog-
nized here. (See Ruiz, The Effect of Section 1915 of the 
Code of Civl,£ Procedure on Migratory Divorces Procured in 
Foreign Countries, 13 So.Cal.L.Rev. 294; Ehrenzweig, Survey 
of California Law 1950·1951, Conflicts of Laws, 141-142.) 
There is no reason to read any requirement of domicile 
or bona fide residence into the statute. The status of persons 
as married or not married should be ascertainable with reason-
able certainty. The valid judgments of courts of other coun-
tries should therefore be respected unless they run counter 
to local policy. The public policy of California may not per-
mit the recognition of a foreign divorce decree when the 
foreign jurisdiction has no legitimate interest in the marital 
status of the parties, when the sole purpose of seeking the 
divorce in a foreign court is to evade the laws of this state 
(see Civ. Code, §§ 150-150.4), or when the divorce is ex parte 
without reasonable notice to the defendant. No such problem 
arises in the present case, since plaintiff was a bona fide resi-
dent of Mexico, neither party was a resident of California, 
and the defendant had reasonable notice. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
,17,1958. 
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